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Protecting the City of London? UK challenges before the Court of Justice of the 
European Union 
 
Pierre Schammo
*
 
 
Since last year, I have reported on a number of challenges which the United Kingdom 
brought before the European Court of Justice. These challenges were directed against 
various EU measures which the UK felt were not in its national interest, or for that 
matter, the interest of the City of London. As a reminder, the challenges concerned: 
  
(i) a proposed financial transaction tax (ie, the Council decision authorizing 
closer cooperation between a group of Member States on a financial 
transaction tax);  
(ii) a provision – Article 28 – of the EU short selling regulation which vests 
the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) with intervention 
powers;    
(iii) the so-called bankers’ bonuses cap under EU capital requirements 
legislation; and 
(iv) the European Central Bank’s location policy under which central 
counterparties that clear sizeable amounts of Euro denominated 
transactions were meant to be located in the Eurozone area.  
 
I have reported on the three first challenges. None of them was successful from a UK 
point of view. It leaves me with one challenge to consider: the challenge – or better, 
the challenges – to the ECB’s location policy. I am referring to ‘challenges’ because 
the UK brought three challenges before the General Court in relation to the location 
policy. I will focus on the one that was decided earlier this year. For reasons that I 
will explain later, there is no need to consider any of the other challenges.  
The ECB’s location policy concerns central counterparties (CCP). A CCP is a 
legal person whose purpose is to stand in between two parties to a financial 
transaction.
1
 The role of the CCP is to make sure that if one of the original parties 
defaults, the contractual obligation owed to the non-defaulting party can be honoured. 
The location policy essentially requires CCPs which clear significant amounts of Euro 
denominated products to be located in the Eurozone area.
2
 For the ECB, the objective 
of this policy, which incidentally had been left unimplemented for a number of years, 
was legitimate. A failing CCP is potentially a risk to financial stability. From the 
ECB’s point of view, control over CCPs, which clear sizeable amounts of Euro 
denominated transactions, should therefore be located within the Eurozone area. For 
the UK however, the policy was a major concern. Specifically, the UK was concerned 
about the impact of the location policy on UK based clearing houses such as 
LCH.Clearnet which has a vast portfolio of euro-denominated business.
3
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The General Court ruled on the UK’s first challenge to the location policy in 
March 2015.
4
 It decided in favour of the UK, ruling that the Eurosystem Oversight 
Policy Framework, in so far as it concerned the location policy, should be annulled. 
The UK clearly had a good case. It made some solid arguments before the General 
Court. Inter alia, the UK argued that the location policy did not square with the 
principles underpinning the internal market. The argument is worth highlighting here, 
because it is symptomatic of a wider concern in the UK about the potential impact 
which an increasingly integrated Eurozone might have on the internal market. Indeed, 
the idea that the internal market might be held hostage to the policies of a group of 
Member States which seek closer integration has been expressed by the UK in 
political fora as well. Thus, during the negotiations of the European Market 
Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) which inter alia puts in place a regulatory and 
supervisory framework for CCPs,
5
 the UK also insisted on including provisions which 
underline the basic principle of non-discrimination and make it plain that 
discrimination against Member States as a place for clearing services ‘in any 
currency’ is not acceptable.6 Concerns over internal market fragmentation were also 
expressed during the negotiations over the Single Supervisory Mechanism, one of the 
pillars of the EU Banking Union. In response, the EU legislature adopted provisions 
which highlight the importance of safeguarding the ‘unity’ or ‘integrity’ of the 
internal market.
7
  
Returning to the location policy challenge, the UK’s focus on preserving free 
movement and the internal market was thus entirely consistent with the position that it 
adopted elsewhere as well. However, the General Court did not address the internal 
market law issue. Instead, it decided against the ECB on grounds of a lack of 
competence. Specifically, the General Court decided that the ECB did not have 
competence to regulate activities of securities clearing systems. It followed that the 
ECB was not competent to impose a requirement on CCPs to be located in the euro 
area. Arguably, by focusing on this competence issue, the General Court provided a 
simple solution from a legal point of view. Nevertheless, one can regret that the 
General Court did not have to examine the internal market problematic. The question 
of possible negative effects of Eurozone activities on common policies such as the 
internal market is likely to remain a cause for concern for Member States which do 
not wish to participate in closer integration. The UK’s other ‘location policy’ 
challenges will not offer any additional insight either. The UK agreed to withdraw its 
remaining court cases after that the ECB and the Bank of England agreed on 
strengthening their relationship with a view to improving financial stability.
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